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INTRODUCTION

It turns out that just about everything we thought about patent
trolls—good or bad—is wrong. Using newly gathered data, this Article presents an ethnography of sorts about highly litigious nonpracticing entity (NPE) plaintiffs. The results are surprising: they
show that the conventional wisdom about patent trolls likely finds its
basis in anecdotal, but infrequently occurring, events. Instead, the
patents enforced by so-called trolls—and the companies that obtained them—look a lot like other litigated patents and their owners.
Scholars, practitioners, and entrepreneurial businesses have all
recognized the growing number of patent plaintiffs who do not produce a product or sell a service, leaving them immune to a counter1
claim for patent infringement. Such immunity significantly reduces
2
the likelihood of a low-cost, cross-licensing settlement; the ten most
3
active NPEs generate legal costs of $500 million at a minimum.
There are many types of NPEs—failed companies, universities, and
individuals, to name a few. Other NPEs are in business simply to assert patents; they obtain their patents from others or even apply for
their own.

1
See Daniel McCurdy, Patent Trolls Erode the Foundation of the U.S. Patent System,
SCI. PROGRESS, Jan. 12, 2009, at 81, available at http://www.scienceprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/01/issue2/mccurdy.pdf (“NPEs do not derive any significant
portion of their revenue from designing, developing, manufacturing, or selling
products, they are essentially immune to counter-assertion claims by the companies
from which they seek royalties.”).
2
For a good discussion of the importance of cross-claims and defensive patenting, see Colleen Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010).
3
The minimum legal costs generated by the ten most active NPEs is based on
the estimate that the legal costs of a single NPE at the summary judgment stage are at
least $500,000. See supra, note 46 and accompanying text.
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“Patent troll” is a pejorative moniker commonly assigned to
4
NPEs because they allegedly wait for an industry to develop, then
appear to exact a toll on companies who commercialize the technol5
ogy. According to the detractors’ narrative, trolls are recent fly-by6
night shops that assert business-method and internet patents. Trolls
7
assert low-quality patents in low-quality litigation. They obtain pa8
tents from failed companies in fire sales. Worse, because trolls do
not make anything, their patents do not provide anything of value to
9
society. In short, according to their critics, patent trolls represent a
significant break from past practices and foreshadow the downfall of
innovative society.
10
NPEs are not, however, without their defenders. According to
their proponents, NPEs create patent markets, and those markets
enhance investment in start-up companies by providing additional li11
quidity options. NPEs help businesses crushed by larger competi12
tors—competitors who infringe valid patents with impunity. NPEs
allow individual inventors to monetize their inventions. These func13
tions, the proponents argue, justify the existence of NPEs.
To be sure, whether an NPE qualifies as a “troll” depends on
who is doing the name-calling. Regardless of how they define “troll,”
though, commentators have used little evidence to support their posi14
tions. The reason is simple: there has been little research about the
patents litigated by NPEs and even less about the sources of those patents.
4
Tam Harbert, If You Can’t Beat Patent Trolls, Join Them, EDN (Sept. 9, 2008),
http://www.edn.com/index.asp?layout=article&articleid=CA6594114.
5
See Sannu K. Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of
Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 119–31 (2010) (providing an overview
of relevant literature and competing arguments).
6
Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent
Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 167 n.36 (2009); see J.P.
Mello, Technology Licensing and Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 388, 391
(2006).
7
Shrestha, supra note 5, at 119.
8
Mello, supra note 6, at 392.
9
See, e.g., Shrestha, supra note 5, at 121–24 (examining arguments that patents
do not add value).
10
Id. at 115–16.
11
Id. at 130.
12
Id. at 127.
13
Id. at 126–29.
14
Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1810 (2007) (“Like most fresh legal questions,
the debate on patent trolls is long on passion and short on proof.”).
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The source of NPE patents matters. If NPEs are acquiring their
patents from productive, inventive entities, then the patent system
may be working better than we thought. Of course, the most efficient
world is one where people spend a lot of time and money inventing,
disclose their ideas through patents, and then refuse to enforce
them. But the patent world has never worked this way, and many
would argue that it should not work this way. Without the potential
for enforcement, there may be less inventive activity.
Understanding NPEs is critically important to better understand15
ing the role of patents in society and in entrepreneurial business.
The debate cannot be resolved without further study of the compa16
nies whose patents are now litigated by NPEs.
This case study of the ten most litigious NPEs is the first step toward understanding some real facts about NPEs and their patents. It
examines their litigation, their patents, and the companies that created those patents. The study includes information about 350 patents asserted in nearly 1000 cases. More importantly, it is the first
study to examine the provenance of patents asserted by NPEs to see
what happened to the inventors/assignees of those patents. Much of
the conventional wisdom is supported by one-time stories that do not
reflect the whole picture.
Most of the “factual” criticisms of NPEs are unsupported by the
evidence.
• First, NPEs are not particularly new.
• Second, their patents look like other litigated patents.
Business methods are not the dominant form, though
there are plenty of software patents and no biotech,
pharmaceutical, or chemical patents.
• Third, while measuring patent quality is extremely difficult, the available information implies that NPE patent
quality is not drastically lower than other litigated pa15
See Markus Reitzig et al., On Sharks, Trolls, and Their Patent Prey—Unrealistic
Damage Awards and Firms’ Strategies of “Being Infringed,” 36 RES. POL’Y 134, 136–37
(2007).
16
See, e.g., Magliocca, supra note 14, at 1810–11 (discussing differing claims about
trolls but noting lack of proof to support either side); Jennifer Kahaulelio Gregory,
Note, The Troll Next Door, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 292, 292 (2007) (“The
use of the term Patent Troll is a mask for underlying fears based on real shortcomings in the patent system, which need to be addressed.”); Andrew Gelman, Info on
Patent
Trolls,
ANDREWGELMAN.COM
(Sept.
6,
2011,
9:55
PM),
http://andrewgelman.com/2011/09/info-on-patent-trolls (“This guy (Michael
Risch) actually did a survey. It seems like cheating to add actual systematic
knowledge to the debate. . . .”).
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tents’. The same cannot be said for litigation quality;
trolls almost never won infringement judgments.
• Fourth, productive companies originally obtained most
of the patents now asserted by NPEs, and non-productive
companies whose only purpose was to obtain and monetize patents originally obtained a few of the patents.
• Fifth, very few of the companies supplying patents to
NPEs are out of business; instead, most patents came
from productive companies and most of those continue
to operate.
• Finally, while the timing of lawsuits was not consistently
“trollish,” the moniker may be somewhat accurate. The
average patent sat on the shelf for more than seven years
before being litigated, though several were asserted almost immediately.
Those defending NPEs do not fare much better.
• First, the evidence does not support a theory that NPEs
incentivize investment by providing a market for patents.
A small percentage of the companies that obtained NPE
patents received venture capital investment, as did a random group of companies that held patents. While there
is a difference between the two, that difference is not
clearly attributable to NPE activity. That said, any startup
holding a patent is much more likely to receive funding
than a company without patents, and it is at least possible
that NPEs contribute to this increased probability.
• Second, it is unlikely that NPEs are vindicating the rights
of small companies forced out of business by infringers.
Very few of the initial owners of NPE patents failed, and
the patents were held for a long time before they were
asserted.
• Finally, the evidence does support one defense of NPEs:
NPEs provide a better way for individual inventors to enforce their patents than bringing lawsuits themselves.
To be sure, this study could not provide the answer to every
question, nor can it conclusively answer some underlying questions,
such as whether NPEs hinder innovation by asserting patents that are
no longer owned by productive companies. Non-litigious NPEs, including universities, were not studied, and the data does not lend itself to rigorous empirical regressions. Even so, this study is a critical
first step to a better understanding the role of NPEs in society.
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Part I presents some background about the NPE debate, including a discussion of the various criticisms of and justifications for
NPEs. Part II describes the methodology and novel data set developed for this study. Part III applies the data from this study to criticisms of NPEs, while Part IV considers how the data applies to defenses of NPEs. The Article concludes with the observation that NPEs
represent a microcosm of inventive society, and how one views each
type of inventor should inform how one views NPEs.
II. BACKGROUND
The assertion of patents by NPEs has captured the imagination
and fears of many who follow the patent system. As this Article is being completed, a simple Google search for “patent trolls” yields more
than 500,000 hits. The same search in Lexis’s LGLPUB database of
law reviews and legal periodicals yields nearly 700 articles. The rhetoric is so heated, and the moniker “patent troll” so pejorative, that
blogs have been devoted to tracking NPEs and have been sued for
17
defamation for doing so. There is an active debate but little evidence supporting either side’s claims.
A. The Debate
The debate centers on a few different areas, namely, quality, innovation, and investment.
One group considers the quality of NPE patents. Some argue
18
that the patents are of low quality and not infringed, so that the NPE
is a nuisance extracting rents from those who would rather avoid the
19
expensive cost of litigation. Others argue that NPEs fully research
20
their patents, pursuing only those least likely to be found invalid.
This leaves defendants with no choice but to settle or face a large

17

See, e.g., Joe Mullen, Troll Tracker Sued: Judge Ward’s Son is One of the Plaintiffs,
ART
BLOG
(Mar.
11,
2008,
12:45
AM),
PRIOR
http://thepriorart.typepad.com/the_prior_art/2008/03/judge-wards-son.html.
18
Magliocca, supra note 14, at 1827.
19
See, e.g., id. at 1829–30 (postulating that vague NPE patents and litigation costs
increase uncertainty and may drive settlements); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 368 (2010) (arguing that NPEs impose transactions costs
that harm commercialization). But see John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent
Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2129 (2007) (asserting that problem of settlements in
excess of value is not limited to NPEs).
20
See e.g., Timo Fischer & Joachim Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology—An Empirical Analysis of Trolls’ Patent Acquisitions 1 (unpublished manuscript) (Apr. 28, 2011) (arguing that NPEs acquire high quality patents), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1523102.
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21

judgment. Characterizing this latter observation as a “problem” is
questionable; while the social costs of patent litigation by nonproducing companies might be debated, it seems doubtful that society is worse off if such entities only chose to enforce the most merito22
rious patents. However, to the extent that any plaintiff can rely on
injunctions or royalties on small pieces of complex products, there is
23
a potential detriment to society.
Another group argues that NPEs hinder innovation because
their “blocking patents” stop otherwise industrious companies from
24
delivering desired products and services to the market. This is more
costly than other litigation because NPEs do not themselves use the
25
patents to create anything of value, and the evidence is clear that
most infringers do not copy from patents but rather independently

21

See Magliocca, supra note 14, at 1828 (arguing that defendants settle not out of
nuisance, but because of fears of high damages and high costs of non-infringing substitutes); Tim Wu, Weapons of Business Destruction How a Tiny Little “Patent Troll” Got
(Feb.
6,
2006,
3:04
PM),
BlackBerry
in
a
Headlock,
SLATE
http://www.slate.com/id/2135559.
22
See Real Drawback to NPE Model is Inefficiency, Not Greed, RPX BLOG (Aug. 13,
2009), http://www.rpxcorp.com/index.cfm?pageid=14&itemid=10 (suggesting NPEs
would serve society better if it were cheaper to enforce patents); cf. Magliocca, supra
note 14, at 1827–28 (pointing out that NPEs were only important during two instances in history of patents, so that patent merit cannot be the sole basis for the
“troll problem”).
23
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2002–03 (2007) (arguing that multiple royalties creates a social
cost). But see Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically
Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535 (2008) (expressing skepticism
that holdup creates excessive royalties).
24
David G. Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open Post-Grant
Review,
2005
DUKE
L.
&
TECH.
REV.
9,
¶
7
(2005),
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2005dltr0009.pdf; cf. James
Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 157, 184 (2007) (noting that software patents may not be consistent with
incentive theory of patents); Sichelman, supra note 19, at 343 (positing that every patent has the potential to block commercialization by others). But see Golden, supra
note 19, at 2155–57 (highlighting the fact that the problem of strategic injunctions
may be greater for competitive companies rather than NPEs).
25
See Magliocca, supra note 14, at 1818–19; Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success
and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 845
(1988) (“The patent system . . . rewards invention directly, and innovation only indirectly.”); id. at 850 (“By separating a firm’s revenue predictions from its assessment of
technical feasibility, the Kamien and Schwartz model lends analytical rigor to the
skepticism some judges have felt intuitively: sometimes firms decide not to innovate;
they do not always try and fail.” (internal citation omitted)). But see Jack Kaufmann,
Afterword, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 527 (1998) (explaining that true technology suppression
is rare).
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26

develop their own technology that happens to infringe. Others argue that the companies that assign their patents to NPEs attempt to
27
commercialize technology, only to lose in the marketplace to large
28
companies that infringe without payment.
Thus, it may be that
NPEs are simply licensing entities that give all inventors better credi29
30
bility in early commercialization and patent enforcement.

26
Christopher Cotropia & Mark Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1421 (2009). Of course, failure to copy may mean wasteful, duplicative inventive activities.
27
See, e.g., Brief for Rembrandt IP Mgmt., LLC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 7–8, eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130).
28
See, e.g., John E. Dubiansky, An Analysis for the Valuation of Venture Capital-Funded
Startup Firm Patents, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 170, 172 (2006) (noting that NPEs create exit strategy for failed start-ups); Magliocca, supra note 14, at 1817–18; James F.
McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 209–11 (2006); Real Drawback
to
NPE
Model
is
Inefficiency,
Not
Greed,
RPX
BLOG,
http://www.rpxcorp.com/index.cfm?pageid=14&itemid=10 (last visited Jan. 25,
2012). But see Merges, supra note 25, at 845–46 (discussing many factors other than
technical superiority that can affect commercial success).
29
See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent
Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 52, 63–64 (2009) (suggesting that NPEs might damage individual inventor mystique, thus reducing their credibility); McDonough, supra note
28, at 198 (pointing out that Thomas Edison, one of the most famous inventors,
would be considered a patent troll today); cf. Iain M. Cockburn & Stefan Wagner,
Patents and the Survival of Internet-Related IPOs, 39 RES. POL’Y 214, 226 (2010) (asserting that patents and patent applications have significant effect on likelihood of acquisition versus failure of internet bubble companies). But see Gwendolyn G. Ball &
Jay P. Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls: Individual Inventors, Small Firms and Entrepreneurs in Patent Litigation 14 (Univ. Ill. Law. & Econ., Working Paper No. LE09-005,
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1337166
(noting that large percentage of patent plaintiffs are individuals and small companies).
30
See Brief for Qualcomm, Inc. and Tessera, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2–3, eBay v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130);
Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small
Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45 (2004) (explaining that small inventors are at
a significant disadvantage in enforcement); Magliocca, supra note 14, at 1818; cf.
Joshua S. Gans et al., When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction?,
33 RAND J. ECON. 571 (2002) (contending that the value of cooperation increases as
IP control becomes stronger and transaction costs decrease); Thomas J. Prusa &
James A. Schmitz, Jr., Are New Firms an Important Source of Innovation? Evidence from the
PC Software Industry, 35 ECON. LETTERS 339, 339 (1991) (explaining that new firms
have comparative advantage in developing new technology while existing firms have
advantage in developing improvements); Sichelman, supra note 19, at 394 (suggesting that failure to enforce patents through compulsory licensing might reduce ex
ante incentive to enter into license agreements with patentees).
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A third group looks at investment incentives. The idea that pa31
tents might be used as tools to obtain venture funding is not new.
Indeed, studies now suggest that a primary benefit of patents—and
even patent applications—is that they signal company value to poten32
tial investors. It is no surprise, then, that some commentators have
suggested that NPEs play a critical role in venture financing. Some
propose that NPEs offer another exit strategy that increases the value
33
of patents. The potential ability to transact with an NPE provides a
type of insurance, but one that applies ex post, as most companies
34
would not pay to obtain ex ante enforcement insurance. This ex
post insurance makes the patent more valuable by providing a potential revenue stream even if the company fails. Others, however, argue
that signal value leads to proliferation of non-productive dormant pa35
tents that are later used by NPEs. They deride the system, claiming
that such patents are merely fire-sale castoffs that lack any commercial value.

31

See, e.g., Dirk Engel & Max Keilbach, Firm-Level Implications of Early Stage Venture
Capital Investment—An Empirical Investigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 150, 166 (2007);
Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 675 (2000); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the
Age of Venture Capital, 4 SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 144 (2000) (suggesting that
study should shift to role of patents in obtaining venture funding); Ronald J. Mann &
Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software Start-Ups, 36 RES. POL’Y 193,
199–200 (2007); Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 961–62 (2005).
32
Stuart J. H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1280 (2009);
Kortum, supra note 31, at 691 (noting that venture funding has causal effect on patenting); Carolin Haeussler et al., To Be Financed or Not . . . —The Role of Patents for
Venture Capital Financing 5–6 (Univ. of Munich, Discussion Paper No. 2009-02, 2009),
available
at
http://epub.ub.unimuenchen.de/8970/1/Haeussler_et_al_VCPat_Jan2009LMU_WP_Reihe.pdf; David
H. Hsu & Rosmarie H. Ziedonis, Patents as Quality Signals for Entrepreneurial Ventures
2–3
(May
2007)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=1717&cf=9.
33
See, e.g., Dubiansky, supra note 28, at 171–72 (2006) (“The new potential of the
R&D licensing market, coupled with the slump in the IPO market, has increased the
attractiveness of using technology transfer as an exit strategy. Firms such as Cerian
Technology Ventures have sprung up to assess and remarket the intellectual property of failed startup firms.”). But see Mann & Sager, supra note 31, at 200 (“On rare
occasions, patents might generate licensing revenues, but that is quite uncommon
for software startups and rarely, if ever, the ex ante aim of a venture capital investment.”).
34
Luigi Buzzacchi & Giuseppe Scellato, Patent Litigation Insurance and R&D Incentives, 28 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 272, 282 (2008).
35
See, e.g., Magliocca, supra note 14, at 1815–17.
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Similarly, some argue that NPEs create a market for patents,
36
even if the firm remains in business. Some argue that such a market
enhances the value of invention, and thus incentivizes inventive pur37
suits.
Patent market theories are generally consistent with a strong pa38
tent rights theory; even so, some commentators suggest that there
39
are better ways to create patent markets. No one has studied whether the initial assignees of NPE-litigated patents themselves attempted
to commercialize technology or were productive companies.
B. Evidence to Date
Some studies have looked at NPE litigation. Many have examined the number of NPE suits in comparison with patent litigation
generally; the uniform findings indicate that NPEs file only a small
40
fraction of all patent infringement suits. It appears, however, that
41
many highly litigated patents are owned by NPEs.
Other studies have examined the quality of patents owned by
trolls. The findings are discussed in more detail below, but none of
these studies has been comprehensive.
Finally, a few studies have examined NPE behavior. One scholar
describes the conditions that foster NPE activity, including difficulty
in avoiding patent infringement, low costs of patenting, and incre42
mental improvements, as the dominant inventive contribution.
36
See, e.g., McDonough, supra note 28, at 209–11; Marc Morgan, Comment, Stop
Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures: A Comment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 165, 173 (2008); Gary Odom, Patent Liquidity,
PATENT
PROSPECTOR
(Oct.
3,
2005,
8:23
PM),
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2005/10/patent_liquidity.html; cf. Paul J. Heald,
A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 490 (2005).
37
See, e.g., Steven Rubin, Defending the Patent Troll: Why These Allegedly Nefarious
Companies Are Actually Beneficial to Innovation, 10 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 60, 62–63 (2007).
38
See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules For Commercializing Inventions,
85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
39
See, e.g., Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Let’s Build a Pit to Catch the
Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 367, 369 (2005); Mark A. Lemley & Nathan
Mhyrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257, 257–59 (2007).
40
Ball & Kesan, supra note 29, at 18; Colleen Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths,
and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1571, 1572 (2009).
41
See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on
Top? The Characteristics of the Most Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 32 (2009)
(showing that approximately half of the most litigated patents are enforced by
NPEs).
42
Magliocca, supra note 14, at 1812.
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These features appear to be true of software and IT patents, but there
is no definitive study showing the technology of NPE-enforced patents. Another study found that licensing companies are more likely
43
to settle cases than other small entities. This follows a theory that
44
NPEs are most successful when they do not reach a jury verdict.
None of the prior evidence settles the debate about NPEs. Existing studies examine the behavior of NPEs once they have patents
without considering the source of their patents. This study is the first
to examine the provenance of NPE patents; this new evidence sheds
light on the debate about NPEs.
III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION
The goal of this study was to find evidence to support the various
positive and negative assertions made about NPEs. To do so, this
study uses a novel data set gathered from several sources, allowing a
look into not only the cases filed by NPEs, but also the sources of the
45
underlying patents.
It is, however, decidedly a study of litigious
NPEs—indeed, the most litigious NPEs.
Patent litigation is notoriously expensive. Legal fees in a case
can range from $500,000 through summary judgment to $4,000,000
46
or more through trial, not to mention administrative costs. Furthermore, evidence shows that patent litigation can lead to a multimillion-dollar market value reduction for companies involved in patent litigation and that at least some of such losses are social costs that
47
are not recouped by the plaintiff. By extension, litigation can drag
48
down productivity and value of privately held defendants.
The most litigious NPEs are worth studying because they, by definition, impose the greatest costs associated with litigation. Even with
a minimal cost of $500,000 per case, these ten NPEs alone generate
costs of nearly $500 million dollars. Additionally, many litigious parties can impose additional social costs by making litigation very complex, most notably by suing many defendants at the same time or as-

43

Ball & Kesan, supra note 29, at 20.
See Magliocca, supra note 14, at 1812–13.
45
The information was gathered by the tireless work of several dedicated assistants in addition to the author’s efforts.
46
JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 132 (2008).
47
Id. at 137–38.
48
See id.
44
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49

serting many patents at the same time. As a result, studying just these ten entities should lead to important conclusions, even if the results do not extend to other NPEs.
While the focus is on active NPEs, this study excludes large but
50
non-litigious NPEs, such as Intellectual Ventures, for a few reasons.
First, and most practically, information relating to nonlitgated patents is not readily available. Second, while non-litigious NPEs are by
no means popular, they are not the object of scorn that litigious entities are. The wrath Intellectual Ventures received when it filed its
51
first lawsuit illustrates this fact.
Third, NPEs that never (or even rarely) file suits may not impose
the same social costs as those that litigate patents. At the very least,
litigation costs are avoided when there is no litigation. Additionally,
early stage settlements and license agreements may cost potential infringers less than post-litigation settlements, though not always. Also,
while one can never know why defendants settle, NPEs that never
have to bring suits may be asserting stronger patents against potential
defendants that are more likely to actually infringe. To be sure, study
of non-litigious NPEs is a worthy exercise, but it is beyond the scope
of this Article.
Similarly, NPEs such as universities are excluded by virtue of not
having sufficient litigation activity to become some of the most liti52
gious. In fact, universities are very rarely patent plaintiffs.
Some might argue that, because this study examines only litigated patents by a small subset of NPEs, the results may not apply to all
NPEs. In some ways this is certainly true; the studied NPEs are very
different than universities, which generate most of their patents
through faculty research rather than through assignment and licensing. Further, a highly litigious NPE will have more experience select49
For examples of both tactics, see In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent
Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1309–13 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, No.
2009-1450, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9473 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 22, 2011).
50
These include the so-called “defensive” patent pools that obtain patents to use
as a defense to suits by competitors. Chien, supra note 2, at 321–22.
51
See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Intellectual Ventures Becomes Patent Troll Public Enemy #1, IP
WATCHDOG
(Dec.
9,
2010,
1:39
PM),
http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/12/09/intellectual-ventures-becomes-patent-trollpublic-enemy-1/id=13711; see also When Patents Attack! (This American Life radio
broadcast July 22, 2011), available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radioarchives/episode/441/when-patents-attack.
52
Ball & Kesan, supra note 29, at 14. But see Jacob H. Rooksby, University Initiation
of Patent Infringement Litigation, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623, 661–62
(2011) (finding that the rate of litigation is high among universities that patent, even
if the absolute number of lawsuits is low).
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ing patents to enforce than a solo inventor suing on his or her own
patent. Indeed, solo-inventor and university plaintiffs have fewer (or
even single) patents, limiting their choices about which patents to
pursue. Non-litigious NPEs, such as Intellectual Ventures, may be different as well, though there is less theoretical reason to think so; the
53
initial Intellectual Ventures patent litigation implies the opposite.
Further, the study’s results should extend to other litigious NPEs
that use similar enforcement models. There is no reason to believe
that slightly less litigious NPEs will acquire and enforce patents differently than the studied NPEs. The least active NPE studied filed
forty-three lawsuits over a twenty-year period while the most active
brought 293, so there is a wide range of activity among the studied
plaintiffs. Also, different types of NPEs are represented in the study,
including those that acquire patents, those that enforce the intellectual property (IP) of a related practicing entity, and those operated
by the inventor of the patents at issue. These types of NPEs mirror
smaller NPEs in kind, even if not in size.
Finally, while statistical methods analyzing the data presented
here lead to some inferences about NPEs, this Article is a cautious
first step. Regression analysis would require more information about
missing, but likely important, covariates as well as a more developed
control data set. Consequently, this Article leaves such analysis to future work.
A. Phase I: NPEs and Their Litigation
54

We selected the ten most litigious NPEs based on recent filings.
The list includes the NPEs involved in the most cases since 2003,
when comprehensive data became available on PACER.
PatentFreedom, an information company that tracks more than 250
55
56
NPEs, provided this list. Because only recently were litigious NPEs
studied, notorious NPE Jerome Lemelson is not on the list—most of

53
See Michael Risch, A Patent Behemoth Rears Its Head, MADISONIAN BLOG (Dec. 8,
2010), http://madisonian.net/2010/12/08/a-patent-behemoth-rears-its-head (arguing that Intellectual Ventures patents have characteristics similar to the patents in
this study, such as the fact that they are coming from individual inventors, start-ups,
and large corporations).
54
The use of “we” throughout this Article refers to the author and research assistants / data coders. Final decisions about methodology and data collection were the
author’s.
55
All About NPEs, PATENTFREEDOM, https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes
(last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
56
The version of the list used in this Article is on file with the author.

RISCH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

470

5/11/2012 5:13 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:457

57

his activities were concluded some time ago. Once the recently active top-ten list was identified, however, litigation data was gathered
for all years available, dating back to 1986 and ending on December
31, 2009.
We did not independently verify that these were, in fact, the
most litigious NPEs, but there is no reason to doubt this assertion,
and there are some reasons to believe it. First, the list includes names
of well-known and high-profile NPEs, such as Acacia Research, General Patent, and Ronald A. Katz. Second, the list includes several pa58
tents that have been identified as the most litigated patents; it stands
to reason that the most litigious NPEs would have the most litigated
59
patents. Third, PatentFreedom’s entire business is based on accuracy, so that it is unlikely that the company would misreport data so
grossly as to change the rankings. Ironically, if this were not, in fact,
an accurate list but instead a randomly dispersed group of NPEs, then
the data might be even more representative of NPEs generally.
After identification of the most litigious NPEs, we identified the
litigations in which they or their related business entities were involved; this was a non-trivial exercise. Some NPEs sued using a single
party name, while others used various subsidiaries—in one case more
than 150. We identified as many subsidiaries as possible for each
NPE using press releases, informal reports, litigation tracker websites,
news services, and, in one case, SEC filings.
Because no single dataset reported all cases for each subsidiary,
we comprehensively searched several sources for litigation involving
these parties, including the Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse
(IPLC), PACER dockets, Lexis and Westlaw docket reports, and the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) and Lexis’s databases
60
of patent litigation notices. Additionally, PatentFreedom generously
agreed to provide its litigation data for the studied entities. We also
kept track of transferred cases to ensure that there was no double
61
counting. Though a few cases were undoubtedly missed, the data
includes the most complete and accurate list of cases available; we

57
It is not clear that Lemelson would make the list in any event. Data provided
by PatentFreedom indicates that Lemelson filed thirty-eight cases, fewer than the
least litigious NPE studied here.
58
See Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 41, at 33–37.
59
The findings discussed below support this.
60
The Patent Act requires district court clerks to notify the PTO when any patent
litigation is initiated. 35 U.S.C. § 290 (2006).
61
We noted the source and destination case numbers so that movement of cases
could be studied in the future.
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found mistakes and typos in many of the databases and even in some
of the source documents filed by the parties themselves!
The litigation data was coded to include case name, location, fil62
ing date, and number of parties. Later, we gathered data about out63
comes of litigation. Table 1 lists the top ten NPEs and the number
of unique cases in which each NPE is a party.
TABLE 1
Troll Name
Acacia Technologies
Rates Technology
Millennium LP
Plutus IP
Catch Curve Inc
General Patent Corp
Ronald A Katz
F&G Research Inc
Papst Licensing GmbH
Cygnus Telecomm.
Total

# Cases
293
137
105
78
71
68
66
58
52
43
971

Cumulative %
30.18%
44.28%
55.10%
63.13%
70.44%
77.45%
84.24%
90.22%
95.57%
100%

Cases / Year
21.7
6.1
8.3
12.0
4.6
5.6
6.3
5.3
2.3
4.5

64

Total Defendants
1143
233.4
111.1
807.18
160.3
114.4
976.8
65.8
82.6
84.9

65

B. Phase II: Patents
The next phase of the study identified the patents at issue in
each of the cases identified in Phase I. To do this, we read the complaints, answers, motions, and other documents accessible in docketing databases. We again searched the USPTO and Lexis databases of
litigation notices.

62
Defendant names were not recorded; some cases had more than 100 defendants. Additionally, we kept track of whether the NPE had filed the case or was a declaratory-relief defendant.
63
Case dispositions change on a daily basis given the large number of recent cases and are best gathered in a short period of time after the remainder of the data set
is complete. Other studies have also tracked outcomes. See John R. Allison, Mark A.
Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99
GEO. L.J. 677, 678–81 (2011); Ball & Kesan, supra note 29, at 9–10; Chien, supra note
40, at 1605–06; Shrestha, supra note 5, at 114.
64
This measure considers all years in which each NPE has been active. Many of
the plaintiffs, however, were more active recently than in prior years (or vice versa),
so that the average may appear incongruent with current activity.
65
Because the number of defendants was not available for all cases, this is a
weighted calculation for those NPEs that had missing data (all but Acacia). The average number of defendants was calculated for the litigation data available, and that
average was then multiplied by the total number of litigations. This assumes, of
course, that each NPE was consistent in the number of defendants sued in each case.
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The ten NPEs were involved in 971 unique litigations. These litigations involved 347 patents. In turn, the 347 patents resulted from
208 initial patent applications, many of which spawned multiple patents.
Many litigated cases involved multiple patents, emphasizing the
repeated use of a relatively small number of inventions. The average
number of litigations for each patent was 8.27 (maximum sixty-four),
and the average number of patents per litigation was 3.62 (maximum
forty-seven).
Phase II revealed a significant limitation of the study; prior to
the introduction of electronic filing in the late 1990s, PACER did not
contain litigation documents. Indeed, because complaints were always filed in paper form to open a case, many districts did not make
complaints available online until approximately 2002 even if they had
adopted electronic filing rules. As a result, there are a few cases with
66
missing patents in the 2000s, and almost all cases filed prior to 1999
are missing patent data. The result is that the 347 patents identified
came from 812 of the 971 litigations.
This should not affect the results tremendously, as only one
NPE, Rates Technologies, had most of its litigation activity before
1999. Further, because NPEs typically litigated the same patents multiple times, it is likely that many of the cases for which data is unavailable involved the same patents already included in the study.
Also, given that many commentators associate the rise of particular NPE behavior with the 2000s, a data set covering post-1999 activity
67
will still provide useful information.
Phase II patent data included the patent number, patent filing
and issue dates, technology classifications, total number of claims, in68
ventors and assignees, and number of continuations. We also determined the earliest claimed priority date for each patent. Patent
citation data was gathered, including references cited (backward
cites) and citing patents (forward cites). Finally, we retrieved assignment history from the USPTO assignments database.

66

Many gaps were filled using litigation notices, but not all court clerks follow
the statute in every case.
67
Of course, there might be a difference in the types of patents litigated now and
those litigated before 2003. Most of the patents litigated after 2003, however, were
issued before 2003 and were certainly filed before 2003, which makes this is a minor
concern. Future studies might obtain paper court filings to determine the patents at
issue in pre-1999 cases.
68
No distinction was made between continuations and continuations-in-part, and
divisionals were not recorded.
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C. Phase III: Initial Assignees
Understanding the role of NPEs depends not only on the attributes of the patents, but also on the source of those patents. While
some NPEs, usually inventor-founded companies, enforce their own
patents, most arrive at the NPE from somewhere else. Just where they
are coming from has yet to be studied and could provide information
to evaluate how one might think about NPEs.
In Phase III, we gathered data about the parties who obtained
each patent—the initial assignees. Inventors must always apply for
69
patents in their own names. They can, however, assign their patent
70
to a company or another person at any time. If an inventor does so
before a deadline set by the USPTO, that assignee is shown on the
71
face of the patent, and is called an “initial assignee.” This study includes data about inventors and initial assignees. Some patents may
have been assigned to other parties shortly after their issuance, but
such conveyances are not considered initial assignments here.
We collected information about the initial assignees of patents.
First, we gathered objective data available in Hoovers and in Dun &
72
Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Database.
Objective data includes
founding date, number of employees, revenues, and industry codes.
Data was not available for all companies across all fields, and missing
73
data was dropped from relevant analytical analysis.
Second, we gathered publicly available information about companies from a variety of sources, including the SEC, press releases, financial web sites, and Wharton’s WRDS database. This data includes
date of initial public offerings, market value at the time of patent filing and grant, and various dummy variables relating to the relationship of the company’s public status and the patent.
Third, we gathered venture investment data using Thomson’s
VentureXpert database. The analysis here assumes that absence from
that database indicates no venture funding for the company. This, of
course, may not be true, but Thomson tracks millions of venture69

35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2006).
Id. § 261.
71
Id. § 152.
72
These databases track private and public company information. The Million
Dollar Database tracks companies with sales over one million dollars. See D&B’s Million Dollar Databases, DUN & BRADSTREET, http://www.dnbmdd.com/mddi (last visited
Feb. 21, 2012).
73
For a variety of reasons, one would expect missing data in Dun & Bradstreet to
skew toward operating companies. For example, companies that operate are more
likely to have sales that can be tracked and employees who can be counted than
nonoperating companies.
70
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backed companies and virtually all of the largest venture funds, so
74
that most venture-backed companies would appear in the database.
Missing venture funding information is, however, a limitation of the
data. The VentureXpert data includes the number of investment
rounds, the amount invested, the date of first investment, and public
offering/acquisition data.
Fourth, we gathered whatever subjective and objective data we
could from other sources, including the internet. This includes press
releases, company name changes, self-reported revenues and employee counts, industry focus, and mergers and acquisitions.
Finally, we tracked whether any sole inventors were licensed at75
torneys in the home state reported on the patent. The intuition is
that a lawyer-inventor is less likely to use the patent in a productive
company. Joint inventors were not included: having an attorney as an
inventor is less probative when multiple inventors are on the patent.
For example, a patent attorney might contribute to an engineer’s invention at the drafting stage.
IV. TESTING NPE CRITICISM
The data collected provides insight into how long NPEs have
been active and what types of patents they assert. This Part presents
some evidence relating to the criticism of NPEs and concludes that
most of the criticism is based on a few, perhaps anecdotal, cases.
A. Are Litigious NPEs a Recent Phenomenon?
The studied NPEs are recently active, but on the whole they did
not originate in this decade. Acacia Technologies is by far the most
active litigant, comprising about one-third of the total cases filed.
Rates Technology is a party in approximately 13% of the cases, but
many of these were prior to 1999; it has been far less active in the last
decade. Millennium LP is a party in about 10% of the cases.
Half of the cases were initiated before July 2005, with an average
of June 2004. This implies that the cases skew earlier, not later. This
is not a surprise, given that the time before 2005 is unbounded, while
the sample included only four years after 2005. The mean initiation

74
There is no reason to believe that there is selection bias, though it is theoretically possible that the types of venture capital companies that would invest in the
types of assignees here are the same types that would be excluded from
VentureXpert. For further discussion of VentureXpert, see Mann & Sager, supra
note 31, at 195.
75
We included all lawyers, not just patent lawyers.
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date will likely become later than the median date as time goes by
and the number of cases filed grows.
Two NPEs, Papst Licensing and Rates Technology, filed their
first cases in 1986. All but one of the NPEs filed their first cases before 2000: Plutus IP first filed in 2003. As of the last date examined,
two NPEs, F&G Research and Cygnus Telecommunications, had not
filed a case since 2008, and one, Ronald A. Katz, had not filed since
late 2007.
The data thus tells a story not often advanced by conventional
wisdom. For some of these NPEs, litigiousness is due to longevity, not
newness and aggressiveness. Papst Licensing, for example, has averaged two cases per year for nearly twenty-five years, far fewer than
many practicing companies today. Due to its long-term patent enforcement strategy, however, its cumulative activity is significant.
Indeed, when aggressiveness in suing defendants is considered,
NPEs lower on the list look more litigious. Ronald Katz is the best
example; while seventh in the number of cases filed, he is second in
the number of defendants sued. Katz has sued nearly fifteen defendants per case on average, compared to 3.9 for Acacia, with F&G suing
76
only 1.1 defendants per litigation.
B. Are All NPE Patents Business Methods?
The patents were related to a variety of different technologies. It
is always difficult to classify technology, especially without detailed
analysis of each patent. Patent classification codes, however, provide
some general information about the variety of patents litigated by
NPEs.
The patent classifications are varied. In the interest of completeness, each patent class—rather than just the first or primary
listed class—was counted. As a result, the number of classes reported
exceeds the number of patents because some patents list multiple
77
classes.
Most of the patents are classified in the USPTO’s communications and computers (Group II), but some are in the mechanical arts
(Group III). A small minority was in the chemical arts (Group I).
Table 2 shows the top eleven subclasses for the studied patents.
Because patents were listed under multiple classes, the top eleven do

76
For a discussion of different NPE patent assertion models, see Chien, supra
note 2, at 328–31.
77
The mean number of classes listed for each patent is 1.8 (619 classes on 347
patents).
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not necessarily constitute 95% of the patents, as the total percentage
implies.
TABLE 2
U.S.
patent
class #

U.S. Classification Description

Patents
Categorized

Percent
(347 Total)

379

Telephonic Communications

73

21.04%

348

Television

54

15.56%

705

Data Processing: Financial, Business Practice,
Management, or Cost / Price Determination

33

9.51%

360

Dynamic Magnetic Information Storage or
Retrieval

29

8.36%

24

6.67%

709

Electrical Computers and Digital Processing
Systems: Multiple Computer or Process
Coordinating

707

Data Processing: Database and File
Management, Data Structures, or Document Processing

23

6.92%

358

Facsimile and Static Presentation Processing

22

6.34%

715

Data Processing: Presentation Processing of Document, Operator Interface Processing, and
Screen Saver Display Processing

21

6.05%

G9B

Information Storage Based on Relative Movement Between Record Carrier and Transducer

21

6.05%

725

Interactive Video Distribution Systems

20

5.76%

340

Communications: Electrical

13

3.75%

Of particular interest is Class 705—data processing: financial,
business practice, management, or price/cost determination—more
commonly known as the catch-all classification of business methods
patents. While a patent may be a business method without falling
under Class 705, any patent listing in Class 705 is almost surely a
78
business method. Thirty-three patents, or 9.5%, include Class 705 as

78

See Gene Quinn, Business Methods by the Numbers: A Look Inside PTO Class 705,
BLOG
(Jan.
22,
2012,
7:15
AM),
IPWATCHDOG
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one of their technology classes, though not necessarily the first. This
suggests that pure business methods are a relatively small part of NPE
litigation, perhaps smaller than conventional wisdom might assume.
Many of the patents, however, were related to software and data
processing even if they were not “pure” business-method or internet
patents. Interestingly, only two of the assignees were incorporated in
California. One might have expected more California companies to
contribute patents if they were internet companies (i.e., businessmethod patents) or if the patents were assigned by failed startups.
Another way to determine whether the patents were business
methods is to consider whether the patents were “high technology”
patents. Professor Colleen Chien identifies a variety of patent classes
that she considers to be high-technology hardware, software, or fi79
nancial inventions. Using those definitions, 40% of the NPE patents
are high technology, including twenty-one hardware patents, eightyfour software patents, and thirty-three financial inventions. This
means that the other 61% do not fall into this definition of high
technology.
While the patents are not dominated by business methods, the
distribution of technologies represented by NPE patents statistically
differs from technologies litigated by non-NPEs. The National Bu80
reau of Economic Research (NBER) database classifies patents into
81
six coarse groupings.
The six classes are: chemical, computers,
82
drugs/medical, electrical, mechanical, and others. These classes
convey little information in themselves, but they are helpful for comparison. Quite simply, the distribution of NBER classes of NPE pa83
tents is different than the classification of all patents involved in liti84
gation filed in 2000 and 2002.
The primary differences are the
relatively infrequent patents in chemical and drugs/medicine catehttp://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/01/22/business-methods-by-the-numbers-a-lookinside-pto-class-705/id=21892.
79
Chien, supra note 40, at 1593. See generally Stuart J.H. Graham & David C.
Mowery, Software Patents: Good News or Bad News?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 45 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 2005).
80
NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org (last visited Feb. 21,
2012).
81
Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights, and
Methodological Tools 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498,
2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8498.pdf. NBER includes an analysis of all patents from 1976 to 2006.
PDP Home, PAT. DATA PROJECT,
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home (last visited April 1, 2012).
82
Hall et al., supra note 81, at 3.
83
And statistically so, with p=0 in a chi-squared test.
84
Ball & Kesan, supra note 29, at 18, 36–37.
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gories enforced by NPEs as compared to the number of such patents
enforced by all patent plaintiffs.
The lack of chemical and pharmaceutical patents is corroborated by NBER’s slightly more detailed technology sub-classifications.
NBER classifies ninety-three of the NPE patents as “communications,”
sixty-one as “computer hardware and software,” thirty as “information
storage,” thirty as “electronic business methods and software,” and
85
twenty-four as “miscellaneous electrical & electronic.” Notably missing are biochemistry and pharmaceuticals.
C. Are NPE Patents and Infringement Claims Low Quality?
Patent quality is notoriously difficult to measure, but the evi86
dence found here and in other studies implies that those criticizing
patent quality need more proof to show NPE patents are weaker than
other litigated patents.
Quality can be measured in three ways. The first is to look at indicia of the patents themselves, such as numbers of citations and
claims. This method, though often used, may not correlate with win
87
rates, and thus many consider the indicia to be poor indicators of
patent quality. The second method is to look at whether such patents
are affirmed in court. The third method is to look simply at whether
NPEs win infringement judgments.
1.

Quality Indicia

With respect to patent indicia, the results of this study are consistent with other studies to consider the quality indicia of NPE enforced patents. Table 3 shows the mean, median, and standard deviation of a variety of traditional patent quality measures associated with
the 347 patents studied here.

85

Data was only available for 319 patents because the NBER data does not include the most recent patents. For the patent data and classification definitions, see
Patn
Data
Description,
NAT’L
BUREAU
OF
ECON.
RESEARCH,
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads/patn-datadescription (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
86
This Article will not probe patent quality of NPE patents in detail; other articles have done so. See, e.g., Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 41; Allison, Lemley
& Walker, supra note 63; Shrestha, supra note 5; Fischer & Henkel, supra note 20.
87
Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 63, at 711.

RISCH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/11/2012 5:13 PM

479

PATENT TROLL MYTHS
TABLE 3
Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Number of
References Cited

80.57

20

199.63

0

1557

Number of
Citations Received

50.16

25

82.33

0

1034

Number of
Continuations

2.48

1

3.65

0

23

33.58

24

33.16

1

254

1.90

1

1.41

1

11

4.71

4

2.88

1

24

Number of Claims
Number of Inventors
Number of Patent
Classes

Table 4 considers several recent studies of patent quality, including random samples of patents litigated by non-NPEs. The comparison is helpful for two primary reasons. First, it shows how NPE patents compare to other litigated patents, regardless of whether one
believes that these measures indicate quality. Second, it helps determine whether the results here generalize to other groups of NPEs.
TABLE 4
Study

Number of
References Cited

Number of
Citations
Received

Number of
Continuations

Number of
Claims

NPE (this
study)

78.12

49.14

2.40

33.09

N/A

~1.32

25.46
(p=0.013)

N/A

~.42

14.87
(p=0.00)

Non-NPE
Litigated

88

Non-NPE
NonLitigated

88

89

†

34.64
(p=0.01)

‡

†

15.16
(p=0.00)

‡‡

John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 454 tbl.1 (2004) (random sample of litigated patents).
89
Id. (random sample of unlitigated patents).

RISCH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

480

5/11/2012 5:13 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
Study
Most Litigated Patents

90

Patents Litigated Once

91

Litigated by
92

Trolls

Litigated by
Non-Trolls

93

[Vol. 42:457

Number of
References Cited

Number of
Citations
Received

Number of
Continuations

Number of
Claims

~122

32.25
(p=0.14)

4.32

39.29
(p=0.01)

~31

14.07
(p=0.00)

1.4

24.46
(p=0.14)

N/A

36
(p=0.31)

N/A

41
(p=0.006)

N/A

15.8
(p=0.00)

N/A

23.5
(p=0.00)

║

#

║

∗

║

Where the data allowed a statistical comparison, the results are reported as follows,
using different tests based on the available data:
†
significant at 99% (log transformed, one sample t)
‡
significant at 95% (one sample t)
‡‡
significant at 99% (one sample t)
║
significant at 99% (two sample t)
#
significant at 99% (age adjusted, log transformed, two sample t)
∗
significant at 99% (age adjusted, two sample t)
Note that tests on the number of claims are difficult, as the number of claims is
skewed and data was unavailable to perform a log transformation. Thus, the tests are
more illustrative than statistically certain.

Some attributes of the patents studied here look much like other
litigated patents. For example, the number of claims is greater than
94
but within a practically similar range as other litigated patents. Even
the number of references cited is close to other litigated patents once
95
outliers are excluded. There is one measure where NPE patents dif90

Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 41, at 13 tbl.2 (sample of the mostlitigated patents).
91
Id. (random sample of patents litigated once).
92
Shrestha, supra note 5, at 151 tbl.2 (sample of patents identified as being litigated by “trolls”). Some of the litigating entities overlap with this study and some do
not.
93
Id. (random sample of litigated patents).
94
Fischer and Henkel find that patents acquired by “trolls” have more claims
than those acquired by non-trolls, which this study corroborates. Fischer & Henkel,
supra note 20, at 17. If one expects trolls to always enforce patents, while others to
acquire patents for a variety of reasons, such as defensive patenting, then this finding
is consistent with prior comparisons between litigated and unlitigated patents. See,
e.g., Allison et al., supra note 88, at 438 (finding litigated patents to have more claims
and backward references).
95
Fischer and Henkel find even fewer references cited (mean of 13.47) in their
sample of patents acquired by trolls. Fischer & Henkel, supra note 20, at 31 tbl.4.
This implies that patents litigated in this study have significantly (meaning statistical-
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fer both statistically and substantially from other litigated patents:
number of citations received. The 50.16 citations received by patents
studied here are high compared to the non-NPE counts of 14.07 and
15.8 but statistically similar to the 32.25 and 36 citations received by
the most litigated and troll-litigated patents examined in other stud96
ies.
This is a potentially important difference. It implies that those
who choose to litigate patents obtained by others attempt to select
important or influential patents, to the extent that the number of
other inventions the patent relates to measures importance and influence. Such highly cited patents might reflect importance for two
reasons. First, such patents might have a better chance at being
found valid, though references cited by the patent have more of an
effect on its validity than forward references by others do. Second,
such patents likely have a larger population of potential infringers
from which to seek royalties or litigation damages. Large numbers of
citations received by such patents imply that they are more than trivi97
al patents, as suggested by some scholars.
Thus, traditional patent quality measures imply at the very least
that NPE patents look a lot like other litigated patents. If one believes that these measures indicate patent quality, then NPE patents
would appear to be of equal or higher quality. They certainly do not
appear to be worse than other patents.
2.

Litigation Outcome

Studies of litigation outcomes may be a better way to determine
patent quality. Here, too, the evidence indicates that NPE patents are
98
not demonstrably worse than other litigated patents. Of the patents
99
studied here, forty-three resulted in merits rulings. Only four were
found completely valid; that is, no claim was held invalid. Another
twenty-three patents (53.5%) were found completely invalid; every asserted claim was found invalid. Additionally, nineteen patents
(44.2%) were found partially invalid; some of the asserted claims
ly and substantively) more backward citations than patents acquired by trolls generally.
96
The large standard deviation accounts for the non-significant differences.
Fischer and Henkel find similar results in unlitigated patents acquired by their definition of patent trolls. Id.
97
See, e.g., Magliocca, supra note 14, at 1827.
98
The findings discussed are not limited to the most litigious patentees, as other
studies used different criteria to select data.
99
Because many cases were consolidated, a single judicial opinion might apply to
many different cases.
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100

were valid and some were invalid.
One patent was found unen101
forceable, but it was also found invalid. The validity of the remain102
ing 314 patents was untested.
These validity results are reasonably close to the results of other
studies. For example, Shrestha found that, of eighteen studied NPE
cases resulting in a judgment on the merits, only three cases (or
103
16%) invalidated patents.
When grouped by final (consolidated)
case, the results in this study show a greater invalidity rate than the
Shrestha study—thirteen cases invalidated patents out of forty-six cases with any merits ruling (or 28.2%). It is unclear why there is a difference in the results. One explanation may be that Shrestha selected cases by NPEs that were discussed on the internet, and those NPEs
and their cases may have had higher win rates. Another difference is
that this study counted merits rulings even if there was no final judgment on the merits with respect to that patent (for example, if other
patents in the case were appealed).
The NPE invalidity rate reported here is higher than that re104
ported in a study of all patent cases filed in 1995, 1997, and 2000.
There, of 584 summary judgment and trial verdicts, only 118 (19.8%)
105
resulted in an invalidity judgment. Here too, the numbers do not
directly compare because the current study only recorded merits rulings rather than all summary judgment and trial verdicts. There were
many summary judgment rulings that did not result in a merits ruling
(that is, where summary judgment was denied). If we counted all
summary judgment rulings, the percentage of rulings invalidating a
patent would have been much lower. Further, the current study
looks at appellate rulings, which may yield different outcomes than
summary judgment and trial verdicts. Even with different bases for
comparison, the 28% invalidation rate here is not so much greater
100

This totals more than forty-four patents because some patents resulted in different rulings in different cases.
101
An unenforceable patent may still have valid claims, but the entire patent may
not be asserted against one or more parties. Invalidity, however, is based only on patent claims; while one claim may be invalid, others may be valid and asserted.
102
A future paper will analyze case outcomes studied here in detail, including timing, type of invalidity, infringement results, and the relationship between quality indicia and outcome.
103
Shrestha, supra note 5, at 158 tbl.5 (finding that, of eighteen studied cases resulting in judgment on the merits, seven cases were won by plaintiff, and only three
cases invalidated patents).
104
See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
237, 275–76 (2006).
105
Id. at 276 tbl.8. The difference was not statistically significant in a t-test.
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than the 20% rate for other litigated patents to justify a conclusion
that NPE patent quality is bad. At most, the conclusion is that the patent quality is a bit worse than the quality of patents enforced generally.
There is one data point to the contrary—for the most litigated
patents, the patents were invalidated in sixty of eighty-six cases decid106
ed on the merits, or about 69% of the time. Even here, the inferences that NPE patents are weaker are not clear. Many of the most
litigated patents were not enforced by NPEs, which implies that after
multiple litigations, a large number of patents will be invalidated,
whether NPE-owned or not. Second, most of the invalidations relat107
ed to written description and on-sale bars, not obviousness. These
are still invalid patents but a different kind of weakness. Third, many
of these outcomes are still pending; for example, invalidity findings
on many of Katz’s patents were recently reversed by the Federal Cir108
cuit but not taken into account in the most-litigated study.
Thus,
appellate outcomes and district court outcomes may not be compa109
rable.
In any event, the most litigated patents in this study fare slightly
better than the most litigated patents examined in the Allison,
110
Lemley, and Walker study (“ALW Study”).
For all patents in this
study litigated seven or more times, there were fifty-two merits rulings. All patent claims were invalidated in thirteen of those rulings—
about 25%. This is far less than the 69% invalidation rate reported in
111
the ALW Study. That is not the end of the analysis, however. Some
(rather than all) of the claims were invalidated in twenty-one other
cases in this study. Thus, the combined percentage of rulings invalidating at least part of a patent in this study (65%) is nearly equal to
112
the invalidation rate reported by the ALW Study (69%).
This implies that the ALW Study’s count may include not only cases in which
the entire patent is invalidated, but also cases in which only part of

106

Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 63, at 706.
Id.
108
In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed.
Cir. 2011), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, No. 2009-1450, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9473
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 22, 2011).
109
See Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 99–100 (2006) (discussing affirmance rates of invalidity decisions).
110
Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 63.
111
See id. at 706.
112
See id.
107
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the patent is invalidated. Consequently, the results of this study are
comparable with the results of the ALW Study.
3.

Do NPEs Bring Quality Cases?

While the patents may not be poor quality in terms of validity,
they are rarely infringed. Of the forty-six cases with merits rulings
(forty of which directly ruled on infringement), only two cases resulted in a finding of literal infringement, and no case found infringement by the doctrine of equivalents. Further, in one of the cases that
found literal infringement, twenty-five other patent/defendant combinations were found not to infringe. This is consistent with other
113
studies.
The infringement results may be connected to the invalidity results. For example, many patents may be construed very narrowly, so
that they are valid (or more likely partially valid) but not infringed.
Interestingly, NPEs likely have more information about infringement
than they do about validity ex ante. Thus, NPEs could be acting strategically to extract rents with non-infringed patents, or NPEs could
believe that their patents are broader than they really are. The data
does not answer this question.
One important caveat is that most cases settle. Indeed, most of
the cases studied here settled or were otherwise disposed of without a
merits ruling. This can affect the findings in a couple of ways. First,
it reduces the sample size. Second, it is unclear why cases settle. It
may be that only the weakest patents are litigated because defendants
refuse to pay. It could also be, however, that the strongest patents are
litigated because plaintiffs refuse to settle for a nuisance payment.
Third, many cases are litigated to judgment because NPEs are asserting infringement when there is none.
D. Do NPE Patents Come from Nonproductive Endeavors?
Initial owners of NPE-litigated patents are similar not only to
owners of other litigated patents, but also to owners of patents generally. While some of the attributes of NPE-litigated patents might differ from other patents, the initial assignees of these patents are similar to a cross-section of inventive society.
Those who believe that NPEs present a net cost to society will at
least have to consider the provenance of these patents; if the sources
113

See id. at 688 (noting that highly litigated patents, many belonging to NPEs, are
often found non-infringed). But see Shrestha, supra note 5, at 158 (explaining that
seven of eighteen cases found non-infringement for NPE litigants, compared to seventeen of twenty-three for non-NPE litigants).
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of patents are pursuing the course intended by the patent system,
then the fact that such patents are alienable should not affect the calculus. As discussed further below, many large, productive companies
associated with positive aspects of the patent system also allowed
NPEs to enforce their patents. Of course, it would be optimal for
companies to pursue research and development to obtain patents
and then never enforce them, but that is an unlikely scenario.
1.

Who Obtained NPE Patents?

A smaller group originally owned the 347 patents in litigation.
There were 150 unique initial assignee/inventor combinations. This
number is deceptively high—several patents were initially owned by
inventors who later formed companies or by various combinations of
the same two or three inventors. As a result, there are fewer than
150, and perhaps fewer than 125, unrelated sources of patents involved in the thousand cases filed by the ten most litigious NPEs.
These NPEs appear to obtain patents from a small group for two
reasons. First, some NPEs obtain all their patents from one or two
sources; this is especially true for inventor operated NPEs. Second,
some NPEs acquire patent families, whereby a single inventor receives
several patents stemming from a single application. The patent family effect is not fully reflected in this study’s data because some patents
stemming from the same original application were initially assigned
to different entities. For example, one application yielded three patents that were initially assigned to three different entities. All three
entities are counted separately here.
Of the 347 patents, 243 were initially assigned to a company;
there were a total of ninety-one unique companies listed as initial as114
signees on these 243 patents. More than 75% of these companies
were corporations while the remainder were LLCs and limited partnerships. Another four patents were initially assigned to two other
entities: a hospital and a university.
The original inventors assigned seven of the patents to four different individuals. In most cases, one of two inventors assigned the
patent to the other inventor, though some patents were assigned to a
non-inventor. The remaining ninety-three patents were unassigned
and initially owned by fifty-three different inventor combinations.

114

Companies that changed from an LLC to a corporation were considered different assignees.
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Corporate Patent Owners Were Productive Companies

Most corporate owners of patents now enforced by NPEs had
business models other than patent licensing. We reviewed the data
available for each assignee, including web sites, press releases, product offerings, corporate structure, and sales data, to classify initial assignees as pure licensing/enforcement entities. Of the ninety-three
entities classified, only twenty, or 21.5%, were non-practicing entities
at the time of patenting, representing 32% of the patents initially as115
signed to a company.
Instead, it appears that the remaining assignees either had or
were attempting to build product or service-based businesses. For
example, seventy-four of the entities were corporations while only
eight were LLCs and seven were limited partnerships. One might
expect more LLCs in the assignees’ group if the purpose of patenting
116
was licensing. One surprising finding is just how few university patents were enforced by the most litigious NPEs—only one.
Other information further implies that these sources of NPE patents were productive companies.
i.

Small/Large Entity Status

Small entities—those with 500 or fewer employees—pay lower
117
fees for patent applications and maintenance; as such, small applicants have a monetary incentive to identify themselves. Small entity
status data were available from the USPTO for 343 of the 347 patents.
Of those, 191 assignees (55.5%) claimed small entity status. This is
similar to the percentage found for once-litigated non-NPE patents
118
(53.7%).

115

Subjective categorization of patentee business models may potentially limit the
findings, as it inherently would in any study of this type. While at least two people (in
addition to the author) examined each company, this particular subjectivity may not
be solved by using multiple coders because the categorizations require judgment
calls about an assignee’s motives. The author resolved all disagreements.
116
The first LLC statute was adopted in 1977, and the last was adopted in 1997.
David K. Staub, Your Information Center for Organizing and Operating an LLC, LTD. LIAB.
CO. CTR., http://www.limitedliabilitycompanycenter.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
117
37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a)(2) (2011); 13 C.F.R. § 121.802(a) (2011).
118
Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 41, at 10. Interestingly, the percentage is
much larger than the representation of small businesses among the most litigated
patents (37.7%). While the most litigated patents included many patents asserted by
NPEs, many were asserted by large companies. The ALW Study argues that Katz
skews the small entity count downward for the most litigated patents because the
Katz patents were not filed with small entity status. Id. at 20–21. This study does not
make such a distinction; many initial assignees of Katz’s patents were, in fact, produc-
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The USPTO could identify ninety-three of these as individuals,
forty-six as small businesses, and three as non-profits; the remaining
forty-nine were uncategorized small entities. This means that, at
most, ninety-five of the 243 patents originally assigned to companies
were small entities. Logic dictates that the remaining 148—42.6% of
the total 347 patents—were assigned to large firms. Compare this to
a study of litigated non-NPE patents, which showed that 37% of the
119
sampled litigated patents were initially issued to large firms.
The
percentage of large entities alone implies that there were many productive companies providing NPE patents.
ii.

Industry Groups

Industry group data was available for forty-five or about half of
the companies. Among those, there were twenty-six North American
120
Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry groups represent121
ed. No single category dominated the types of companies. The top
five categories (using four-digit NAICS codes) were Computer Systems Design and Related Services (six companies,13.3% of the total);
Navigational, Measuring, Electromedical, and Control Instruments
Manufacturing (four companies, 8.8%); and Semiconductor and
Other Electronic Component Manufacturing, Other Financial Investment Activities, Electronics and Appliance Stores (three companies, 6.7% each). And while computer systems, controls, semiconductors, and communications were the best represented industries, a
university, a hospital, a doctor, a construction manufacturer, and a
cleaning compound manufacturer were also included.
iii. Financing
Nineteen initial assignees (20%) were publicly traded at some
point, and additional twelve were subsidiaries whose ultimate parent
is publicly traded. Also, twenty-six of the companies were incorporated in Delaware, which is consistent with the number of public
companies and their subsidiaries.
For those companies that were public at the time of patenting
(either eight at the time of filing or nine at the time of issuance),

tive companies and as such are fairly counted as large entities if they did not seek
small entity status.
119
Allison et al., supra note 88, at 466.
120
North American Industry Classification System, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics (last updated Jan. 11, 2012).
121
This classification was based on four digits of NAICS. At five digits, there were
also twenty-six, and at six digits, there were thirty-two.
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market value ranged from $100 million to over $122 billion. Companies’ market value for both the date of filing and the date of issuance
was available in the case of fourteen patents assigned to seven public
companies. The median change in market value between filing and
issuance was a gain of $93 million (the largest gain was $60 billion,
skewing the mean). The largest loss in value, however, was $1.6 billion, and companies that lost market value between patent filing and
issuance held six patents.
Venture funding also implies a non-licensing business model.
Sixteen of the assignees, about 17.6%, appeared in the VentureXpert
database, with a mean total investment of $22.25 million and a median investment of $10.12 million. Investment varied from much less
than $500,000 to $72.49 million, with a standard deviation of $23.44
million. Seven of these companies went public and another five were
122
acquired by non-NPE public companies. In sum, thirty-five—more
than a third—of the companies were public, a public subsidiary or
venture-backed. Similarly, forty-two of the companies were listed in
123
the public records of Hoovers or Dun & Bradstreet.
iv. Sales and Employees
Finally, sales and employee numbers ranged widely. Sales data
was available for forty-one companies and employee data was available for fifty-one companies. Sales ranged from less than $1 million to
$79 billion (median of $6.3 million). Number of employees ranged
from four to 172,438 (median of twenty-nine).
3.

The Role of Individuals

While there were many business entities that obtained patents, a
large portion of the patents were initially held by individuals. Perhaps these individuals were not patenting for productive reasons.
Unfortunately, little is discernible about individual patentees. Some
are related to companies that eventually became NPEs, but this is not
necessarily probative. For example, Henry Von Kohorn did not assign every patent to his company, Response Reward Systems; two of
the patents in the study are listed as individually owned. Response
Reward Systems, in turn, appears to have been an inventor-owned
company, but General Patent Corporation, an acquisition-based NPE,
now enforces its patents.
122
Acacia Research is publicly traded, but it was not the acquirer of these venturefunded companies.
123
More companies were likely listed in the private credit databases of Dun &
Bradstreet.
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In another example, Joseph Weinberger held five patents individually, assigned four patents to companies that were not licensing
entities, and assigned two other patents to Rates Technologies, a li124
censing NPE.
All of his patents are now enforced by Rates Technologies.
Indeed, even if an inventor enforces his or her own patents, it
may not mean that they were initially non-productive. Ronald Katz,
one of the more famous individual NPEs (though an LLC technically
enforces his patents), initially assigned most of his patents to First Data Resources, a going concern affiliated with American Express that
eventually went public.
There are a few individual inventors, however, who did not assign their patents to any entity. It is difficult to know what efforts
such inventors made to commercialize or enforce their patents before allowing an NPE to do so.
In an effort to shed light on the role of individuals, we tested
whether the inventor was a lawyer in his or her home state. The intuition is that lawyer-inventors are more likely to have a licensing business model; that is, lawyers are likely NPEs rather than commercial
companies. We considered 183 of the patents. Of the patents with
one inventor, eleven were invented by lawyers, with another ten possibly claimed by lawyers, for a total of 5.8% of all patents, and 11.4%
of single-inventor patents. Thus, it appears that at least some NPE
patents come from lawyers themselves.
E. Do NPEs Get Their Patents from Fire Sales?
A surprisingly small number of companies were demonstrably
defunct—only nine of ninety-one, or 9.9%. We could not find the
status of nine companies. Five of them are licensing entities, so information is expectedly scarce. It stands to reason that the other four
companies are non-operational, bringing the total to thirteen, or
14.3%. The remaining seventy-eight (85.7%), in addition to the university and the hospital, appear to be operating today, even if only as
a recipient of licensing revenues.
Whether a company is out of business is only one data point.
Companies may license their patents when under distress even if they
do not fail. Acquisitions may shed some light on the question. A total of twenty-five (27.4%) of the companies have been acquired at
some point, four by NPEs. The implications of these data are a bit

124

Some of the patents Weinberger held individually were assigned to him by coinventors.
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ambiguous, as some companies might be acquired if successful, while
others might be acquired in a fire sale. In any event, any characterization that all, or even most, patents were acquired in a fire sale is unsupported by the evidence.
F.

Do NPEs Really Wait for an Industry to Develop?

We examined the timing of issuance, filing, and assignments to
test how long NPEs wait before filing suit. The longer they waited,
the more like mythical trolls their behavior might appear, even if
125
there are other explanations for delay. If wait times are short, however, that might imply that NPEs are vindicating the rights of contemporaneous competitors or, alternatively, that they are rushing to
file suit after patents issue.
The average number of days between patent issuance and the filing of a complaint was 3021 days (about 8.3 years) with a standard
deviation of 1864 days (5.1 years). The median was 2900 days (8.1
126
years), suggesting that the data is not skewed.
When the time to
127
first filing of a complaint for each patent is considered, the mean
delay is still 2559 days (7.0 years). One would expect that the time to
file suit would grow shorter as the issue date gets closer to the present, given that the date of filing a complaint is bounded by December 31, 2009. This appears to be true, based on a correlation value of
.22 between the date of issue and shelf time, but there are clearly
other factors that lead to the timing of suits.
Finally, it appears that many of these patents sat on the shelf not
only before suit was filed, but also before assignment to the NPEs.
The mean time between patent issuance and the last assignment rec128
orded was 2566 days (7.0 years) with a median of 2197 days (6.0
years) and standard deviation of 1842 days (5.1 years).
The assignment records do not lead to a clear conclusion because the last assignment might not be to the NPE, and other assignments may not be recorded in the database. Nonetheless, it ap125
See, e.g., Allison, Walker & Lemley, supra note 63, at 706 (arguing that long
continuation chains imply that patent applications were filed before industry developed); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 237 (1998) (noting that litigated patents took, on average,
12.3 years from filing of the application to resolution of the case).
126
The dates are obviously truncated at zero.
127
All future complaints seeking to enforce a patent will only increase the average
delay.
128
This count excludes assignments recorded before the issuance of a patent,
though some of such assignments might have been to an NPE. The total number of
patents considered was 130.
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pears that a good portion of any delay is attributable to the inven129
tor/initial assignee as opposed to the NPEs.
V. TESTING NPE JUSTIFICATIONS
The data allows for analysis of three different normative justifications of NPEs: 1) NPEs create a patent market that enhances investment, 2) NPEs provide enforcement for small companies crushed by
large competitors that infringe with impunity, and 3) NPEs vindicate
the rights of individual inventors.
A. Do NPEs Promote Investment in Startups?
A primary justification of NPEs is that they provide an aftermarket for patents of failed (and even going) companies, providing a
130
new liquidity option that enhances investment in startups. There is
no doubt that NPEs help create markets for patents, but the social
benefits of this are questionable if the market does not promote innovation and investment in research and development. Investment
in startups is one proxy for such social benefits.
Examining this question involves two components: 1) the rate of
venture capital investment among companies and 2) how often failed
companies contribute patents. While the data show that companies
contributing NPE patents have a slightly higher rate of venture capital investment than other patent holding companies, the small number of failed companies contributing patents and the small percentage of firms receiving venture funding implies that NPEs may have
minimal investment-inducing benefits even if they marginally increase the likelihood of investment.
The first component is the rate of venture capitalization among
firms with and without patents. The Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) of
startups provides a control data set. The KFS is a panel survey of
131
nearly 5000 companies founded in 2004. The survey tracks companies in several categories, including whether they hold patents and
132
receive venture funding. This data provides some areas of comparison.
129

It was impossible to test delay directly by the NPE because the last assignment
often occurred after lawsuits were instigated. Thus, deciphering which assignments
applied to which lawsuits yielded little information.
130
Shrestha, supra note 5, at 130.
131
About the Kauffman Firm Survey, EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND.,
http://www.kauffman.org/kfs/About-the-KFS.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
132
ALICIA ROBB & DAVID DESROCHES, KAUFFMAN FIRM SURVEY: BASELINE / FIRST
FOLLOW-UP / SECOND FOLLOW-UP / THIRD FOLLOW-UP / FOURTH / FIFTH FOLLOW-UP
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Table 5 shows venture capital investment rates for firms with and
without patents. The last column is the p-value for the hypothesis
that the observed rate of venture capital (VC) funding among the
KFS firms is the same as that observed in this study.
TABLE 5
Study

N Companies

N VC Financed

% Financed

p-value
(one-tailed)

NPE contributors

91

16

17.6%

N/A

263

28

10.6%

.06

4665

41

.9%

0.00

KFS (firms having
patents)
KFS (firms without
patents)

The data show a slightly higher, but statistically significant, venture capital investment rate for NPE-contributor companies than for
other firms with patents. Further, the difference in venture funding
between companies with patents and those without patents is both
statistically significant and economically striking.
One might conclude, therefore, that the existence of NPEs may
well improve investment opportunities for all companies that hold
patents. This conclusion, however, is tenuous. First, the timing of investments might explain the difference. The median date of venture
funding for NPE contributors was in 1997 with only one after March
2001, whereas all of the KFS firms were started in 2004. Differential
investments between the boom during the late 1990s and the postrecession period in the middle of the last decade could explain the
entire difference.
133
Second, as discussed above, patents might be used—whether
rationally or not—as indicia of technological value unrelated to an
aftermarket for those patents.
Third, the number of patent-holding companies dwarfs the
number of NPEs, and only a small fraction of firms with patents re134
ceived venture funding.
The odds of any one firm convincing investors to gamble because they both have patents and might be able
to license to an NPE are long indeed.

350–51,
1242–43
(2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1934895.
133
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
134
The same is true of all start-ups—not just those related to NPEs. Mann &
Sager, supra note 31, at 197. But see Graham et al., supra note 32, at 1280–81.
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As a result, venture capital reliance on potential aftermarket activity cannot be considered a large part of the equation unless there
was strong evidence that venture capitalists examined patent quality
135
as carefully as NPEs do. Survey evidence shows the contrary.
Thus, while the differential rate of venture funding implies that
136
patenting is at least correlated with investment, the conventional
story that NPEs provide investment incentive by creating an aftermarket appears to be consistent with the evidence but still somewhat
questionable.
The second component is how many of the patents were contributed by failed startups. As noted above, around 14.2% of the
companies that originally obtained the NPE patents are defunct.
More telling, however, is the fact that only three of the thirteen failed
companies received venture funding. Further, only two of the sixteen
venture-backed companies were acquired by NPEs, and those companies were already publicly traded at the time of the acquisition. In
other words, if NPEs are supposed to be a source of post-failure liquidity in order to encourage venture funding, then they are doing a
seemingly poor job of it in practice.
Nonetheless, this finding does not rule out some role of NPEs in
aiding venture capital investment. The availability of an additional
enforcement option may unmeasurably attract venture capital as one
137
of many signals, especially for risk seeking investors or those that
have a relationship with an NPE. This effect may be one of the reasons why NPE contributors were more likely to have venture capital
investments than the Kauffman panel sample. Support for this theory, however, will likely require more data, including a better understanding of the ex ante motives of venture capitalists. The data here
could be combined with other data on venture financing to perform
regressions to capture the effect of NPEs, but that is left for future research.

135

Graham et al., supra note 32, at 1281–83; Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman,
Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1077–78 (2008).
136
See Mann & Sager, supra note 31, at 199–201 (finding a correlation between
patenting and financing).
137
See Graham & Sichelman, supra note 135, at 1079 (“If a patent can be sold to
others who are well-positioned to demand royalties or file infringement suits, it may
have value quite apart from its utility to the business model of the start-up venture.”).
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B. Are Small Companies Crushed by Larger Infringers?
Some justify NPEs by arguing that they aid small businesses
138
harmed by large infringers. Patents of small companies driven out
of business by their larger competitors do not dominate NPE litigated
patents. First, small firms are likely able to bring their own lawsuits.
139
More than 35% of all patent plaintiffs are small firms.
Second, as
noted above, small entities according to the USPTO—which at 500
employees may be much bigger than “small firms”—represent the
same percentage of both NPE patents and litigated non-NPE patents—about 50%. Third, only 14% of these companies were out of
business. Fourth, the long average time between patent issuance and
litigation initiation implies that many patents were obtained well before any head-to-head competition might have occurred.
Undoubtedly, some of the patents enforced by NPEs were created by companies driven out of business by large competitors, but the
data does not support a view that many patents fit this description.
Instead, it appears that these patents were very early attempts to patent in a field of technology and had little relevance until asserted
much later—one reason why they are so maddening to defendants.
C. Do NPEs Provide Better Enforcement Avenues for Individuals?
A third justification of NPEs is that they provide better opportu140
nities for individual inventors to enforce their patents.
There are
two reasons NPEs might do so. First, they may provide cost, money,
and other resources to continue litigation in cases when contingent141
fee lawyers may not provide such resources. Second, they may provide better credibility for settlement purposes. Each of these reasons
explains why NPEs might serve the needs of individuals in ways unnecessary for small companies. The evidence here supports an individual-inventor theory more than any other theory.
It is certainly true that NPEs enforce patents assigned to individuals; individuals initially owned about 27% of the patents in this
study, and inventor-owned companies, like Von Kohorn’s Response

138

See, e.g., Shrestha, supra note 5, at 127.
Ball & Kesan, supra note 29, at 31.
140
Shrestha, supra note 5, at 126–29.
141
See id. at 147 (noting that NPEs settle cases less often than individuals enforcing their own patents); Ball & Kesan, supra note 29, at 17–18 (finding that small parties are active in the legal system, but that “just under 20%” of pairings are small
plaintiff/ large defendant). Individuals are only approximately one-fifth of the small
defendants, meaning that only 4% of cases involved an individual versus a large defendant.
139
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Reward patents, held several others. Still more, like the Katz and
Papst patents, were initially owned by productive companies, but have
since been assigned back to companies run by the initial inventors or
their families. This does not necessarily mean, however, that NPEs
provide new or better opportunities as compared with business assignees of patents.
One tool to test the role of NPEs is the Lemley and Myhrvold
142
categorization of patent plaintiffs.
This categorization is helpful
because it allows for analytical analysis of each type of NPE rather
than simply calling them all “trolls.” Of the twelve categories, only
143
one category, “product company,” includes practicing entities.
Each of the other categories describes some type of NPE, from those
entities that merely acquire patents to enforce, to inventor-owned
144
145
companies, to inventors themselves.
Table 6 compares categorizations for this study with the ALW
Study’s categorizations for the most-litigated patents (many of which
are now owned by NPEs) as well as with a random sample of oncelitigated patents. The ALW Study categorized the current owners,
while this study categorizes initial owners, whether or not they are
currently the plaintiffs. This leads to some key differences discussed
after the table.
TABLE 6
This
study

%

Most
Litigated

%

Once
Litigated

%

1 (Acquired Patents)

31

8.93%

12

11.21%

3

2.83%

2 (University Heritage)

0

0.00%

0

0.00%

1

0.94%

3 (Failed Startup)

7

2.02%

0

0.00%

3

2.83%

4 (Corporate Heritage)

0

0.00%

0

0.00%

1

0.94%

51

14.70%

43

40.19%

7

6.60%

4

1.15%

0

0.00%

1

0.94%

5 (Individual-inventorstarted Company)
6 (University /
Governm e n t / NGO)

142

Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 41, at 10.
Id. Service companies are included in the product company category.
144
We categorized companies that sell something as product companies, even if
they were founded by the inventor. After all, such companies are not NPEs.
145
Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 41, at 10.
143
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This
study

%

Most
Litigated

%

Once
Litigated

%

5

1.44%

0

0.00%

0

0.00%

8 (Product Company)

144

41.50%

47

43.93%

85

80.19%

9 (Individual)

103

29.68%

2

1.87%

0

0.00%

10 (Undetermined)

0

0.00%

3

2.80%

4

3.77%

11 (Industry Consortium)

0

0.00%

0

0.00%

1

0.94%

12 (IP Subsidiary of Product
Company)

2

0.58%

0

0.00%

0

0.00%

7 (Startup, Pre-product)

146

With the notable exception of category nine, individual inventors, the categorizations of initial assignees in this study fall somewhere between the categorizations of plaintiffs enforcing patents only
147
once and plaintiffs enforcing patents many times.
This table supports the finding above that a significant percentage of NPE patents—nearly half—came from productive companies.
The biggest difference is the large percentage of product companies that enforced once-litigated patents, compared to zero individuals. In contrast, individual inventors contributed 29% of the patents to the NPEs in this study. An extension of this is the doubled
percentage difference between NPE patents in this study and random
once-litigated patents for category five, inventor-founded companies,
from approximately 6% to 14%.
This implies that individuals are more likely to be represented in
NPE litigation than in the general population of patent plaintiffs. It
is notable that a large percentage of NPE enforced patents were originally held by individuals and their companies, while not a single individual owned a patent litigated in the ALW Study sample.
Of course, the ALW Study sample is quite small, and there are
surely individual-patentee plaintiffs. For example, another study—
the much-cited Valuable Patents analysis—found that while individuals
obtain 18% of all patents, 27% of the litigated patents observed in

146
Id. This study’s categorizations are a bit arbitrary with respect to categories
seven and eight. The categorizations were usually based on the company’s status
during the time between filing and patent issuance, but in many cases it was difficult
to tell when a product was released. Thus, a company that later shipped a product
might have been in category eight when it perhaps should have been in category seven. The differences do not affect the conclusions.
147
Fisher’s Exact for each of these was 0.00, implying that the categories were statistically significantly different.
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148

that study were unassigned at time of issue.
The study did not re149
port who brought suit.
A comparison to the provenance of NPE patents here leads to
potentially ambiguous results. On the one hand, the 27% from Valuable Patents is close to the 28% found here, which might imply that
the same proportion of patents initially owned by the inventor get litigated regardless of who litigates them. On the other hand, it is unclear what proportion of patents in Valuable Patents was enforced by
the original inventors as opposed to later assignees.
Comparison with a different study of all patent lawsuits filed in
2000 and 2002 might shed more light on this question. That study
showed that 14% and 12% of patent plaintiffs, in 2000 and 2002 re150
spectively, were individuals.
Given that individuals initially owned
28% (or 40% if inventor-founded companies are included) of the patents enforced by NPEs, NPEs appear to be an important outlet for
the enforcement of inventor-owned patents. Even excluding inventor-owned NPEs, NPEs enforce around twice the percentage of patents that inventor plaintiffs enforce in a random population of liti151
gated patents.
Of course, just because NPEs allow inventors to enforce their patents does not mean that NPEs are normatively justified. The answer
to that question depends on whether one believes that it is better for
inventors to enforce their patents or for the patents to remain
dormant, or even whether unaffiliated inventors should be entitled to
patents at all.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
NPE enforcement is more complex than any of the traditional
stories about patent trolls indicate, and the conventional wisdom appears to be based on periodic anecdotal accounts that are true only
some of the time.

148

Allison et al., supra note 88, at 465 n.131.
Id.
150
Ball & Kesan, supra note 29, at 31.
151
Individuals obtained 28% of the patents enforced by NPEs. Individuals obtained patents in 14% of all patent cases. Here too, the data is not iron clad because
this study counted by patent, but the general litigation data counted by case, not by
patent. It may be that individuals enforce more patents per case than other types of
plaintiffs, though there is no basis to think so.
149
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There is no uniform story about NPE patents or where they
152
come from. While some are business-method patents, most are not.
While some litigated patents come from failed start-ups, most do not.
While some patents were initially assigned to licensing NPEs, most
were not. Indeed, some extremely large companies—and even the
federal government—have turned to the very same NPEs to enforce
some patents.
Some patents enforced by NPEs are invalid, while most are not.
NPEs litigate patents with objective indicia that are similar to other
litigated patents and appear to be invalidated about as often as other
153
litigated patents, so long as they are not repeatedly asserted.
To be sure, not every patent is valid and most have at least one
invalid claim, but NPEs choose to litigate patents that look like the
patents that productive entities enforce. Nonetheless, the social effects of this practice are unknown. Corporate defendants surely dislike defending against patents that are more difficult to invalidate. If
NPEs are to bring any value to their constituents, however, they can
best do so by litigating strong patents and leaving weak patents on the
shelf.
Even a finding of average patent quality refutes the conventional
wisdom that NPEs seek to extract rents with weak patents. It may be
that parties settle weak patent claims for a nuisance fee before litigation is filed, but even if true, it is telling that defendants would be
willing to litigate only the strongest patents. Perhaps more is at stake,
and thus there is a selection bias in the data.
These findings imply that patenting activity that leads to NPE
litigation is a microcosm of patenting in general. NPE patents come
from individuals, start-ups, established companies, failed companies,
licensing companies, and public companies, and, with the notable
exception of biotech/pharma, the patents look similar to others.
There is, however, one marked difference. Individuals may face
a significant disadvantage in high-stakes patent litigation unless they
allow NPEs to enforce their patents. This means that NPE litigation
may be the best way for garage inventors to capitalize on their patents
if infringers refuse to license.

152

Because this is a population study, the primary source of bias is uncollectable
data. For the most part, there is no reason to believe that uncollectable data is sufficiently different from the available data to create a uniform story.
153
And when the NPE patents are repeatedly asserted, they are invalidated just as
often as patents that are repeatedly asserted by productive companies.
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These observations suggest that how one feels about NPEs depends on how one feels about patenting in general. After all, any patent may be alienated and enforced by another.
Those who favor strong patent rights should be equally happy
whether a large public company, a startup, or an NPE enforces the
patent for them. Those who believe that patents impede innovation
should be equally unhappy regardless of the suing entity.
The same is true for different technologies. Because NPEs enforce a variety of patents that reflect a variety of different commercial
fields, normative judgment of NPE enforcement should be based on
judgment of the underlying technology. An NPE enforcing a business method is little different than an operating company enforcing a
business method.
To be sure, the NPE is not currently producing a consumer benefit in exchange for the method, but that has never been the quid
154
pro quo for patents. Based on the data here, it can be concluded
that the initial inventor of a business method disclosed the patent
and most likely attempted to commercialize it. Of course, if one believes in working requirements that force inventors to practice patents before enforcing them, then one should still be indifferent between a non-operating startup and an NPE.
Similarly, one’s beliefs about individual inventors should inform
155
one’s beliefs about NPEs. Strong believers in individual inventing
will favor NPEs because they provide a remedy to such inventors. On
the other hand, those who believe individual inventors contribute lit156
tle to innovation and growth will not favor NPEs.
As patenting society goes, so go NPEs. While it is useful to study
their benefits and costs, scholars, courts, and policy-makers should
not lose sight of the fact that an NPE bringing a lawsuit could just as
well be the entity that sought the patent initially in the first place.

154
Patentees need not practice their invention to enforce a patent. Cf. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 (2006) (omitting right to practice patent from exclusive rights).
155
See generally Cotropia, supra note 29.
156
See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 46, at 169.

